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20 August 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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Indonesia: [The Indonesian Army is continuing its moves to prevent any significant resurgence of pro-Sukarno elements.]

[The basis for the establishment of sweeping army power over political activity appears to have been laid at an 11-14 August meeting of Javanese civil and military officials, which called for unified policy on "ideology, politics, social affairs, economics, and defense."]

[The army has already undertaken a determined intraservice indoctrination program to ensure army-wide support for the new regime, and has intensified its surveillance of Communists and the large National Party (PNI), which is still loyal to President Sukarno. The army has also accelerated plans for much needed flood control and increased rice production in East and Central Java, where the PNI has its greatest strength.]

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[The PNI is engaged in an intensive ideological and organizational program directed toward the 1968 elections and appears to have ample funds. It not only is bringing into its ranks ex-Communists who have been cleared by the army but, at Sukarno's request, has agreed to admit Communists, particularly members of the youth front. PNI youth, armed with knives and chains, clashed with anti-Sukarno youth elements in Bandung, West Java on 19 August.]

[Army chief General Suharto and Adam Malik, in his capacity as first minister for political affairs, are reported to have agreed on 13 August that a popular movement should be launched against Sukarno himself. Press and political reaction to Sukarno's 17 August speech--in which he insisted that he still holds pre-eminent power--was largely critical and may have been inspired by the army.]

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Brazil: Discontent with political and economic conditions appears to be increasing in almost all sectors of Brazilian society, although the government still is firmly in control.

The government is under fire from businessmen and coffee growers opposed to its austere economic policies, from a few hard-line military officers, and from church leaders critical of its failure to alleviate poverty in the northeast. Students and labor have been especially outspoken in recent weeks.

Carlos Lacerda, a popular leader of the 1964 revolution which ousted leftist President Goulart, is one of the most vocal administration critics. General Amaury Kruel, another revolutionary leader, issued upon his recent retirement a manifesto criticizing the government of betraying the revolution and using its powers arbitrarily, but his statement failed to arouse significant military or political support.

Scattered incidents of violence and approaching elections are adding to the widespread malaise facing the administration of President Castello Branco. State legislatures in 12 of the 22 states will elect governors on 3 September; congress will choose the president on 3 October; and direct elections for congress are scheduled for 15 November. Government efforts to ensure election of proadministration candidates have aroused severe criticism of the regime as authoritarian and undemocratic and have led the only legal opposition party to boycott the presidential and gubernatorial elections.

No one issue unites the administration's disparate critics, and as yet opposition has not coalesced around any one group or leader. There is no evidence of significant plotting against the regime and Castello Branco appears able to count on the continuing loyalty of most of the military.

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
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NOTES



Yemen: Kuwait has announced that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian negotiators have agreed on a tentative peace formula to end the four-year civil war in Yemen. The formula, whose details have not yet been made public, is to be referred to the two governments for ratification. The history of past attempts at a settlement, however, casts doubt that the present effort will be successful.

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Nigeria: [Criticism and suspicion of the US are evidently growing in Hausa-dominated northern Nigeria, where sentiment for a virtually complete political separation from the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria is running high. This incipient anti-Americanism stems from concern, apparently shared by many northerners, that the US favors the East over the North in their current confrontation. Should such concern intensify, it could eventually cause problems for the space tracking [redacted] stations maintained by the US in Northern Nigeria.]

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United Nations: Raul Prebisch, head of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, is in Moscow, where he is said to be seeking Soviet support for himself for the post of UN Secretary General. Prebisch, an Argentine, has frequently been mentioned as a possible successor to U Thant. [Meanwhile, [redacted]]

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[U Thant wants assurances from the US and the USSR that they will make greater use of his office before he decides on accepting reappointment. He has not yet raised this issue with US officials.]

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